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Abstract Although chimpanzees understand what others
may see, it is unclear whether they understand how others
see things (Level 2 perspective-taking). We investigated
whether chimpanzees can predict the behavior of a con-
specific which is holding a mistaken perspective that dif-
fers from their own. The subject competed with a
conspecific over two food sticks. While the subject could
see that both were the same size, to the competitor one
appeared bigger than the other. In a previously established
game, the competitor chose one stick in private first and the
subject chose thereafter, without knowing which of the
sticks was gone. Chimpanzees and 6-year-old children
chose the ‘riskier’ stick (that looked bigger to the com-
petitor) significantly less in the game than in a nonsocial
control. Children chose randomly in the control, thus
showing Level 2 perspective-taking skills; in contrast,
chimpanzees had a preference for the ‘riskier’ stick here,
rendering it possible that they attributed their own prefer-
ence to the competitor to predict her choice. We thus run a
follow-up in which chimpanzees did not have a preference
in the control. Now, they also chose randomly in the game.
We conclude that chimpanzees solved the task by
attributing their own preference to the other, while children
truly understood the other’s mistaken perspective.
Keywords Perspective-taking  Appearance–reality 
Deception  False belief  Chimpanzee
Introduction
Chimpanzees are proficient when judging what others can
see—they follow others’ gaze direction (Tomasello et al.
1998), even around barriers (Bra¨uer et al. 2005; Hare et al.
2000), can take into account what a competitor can and
cannot see when competing for food (Bra¨uer et al. 2007;
Hare et al. 2000; Kaminski et al. 2008), and make use of
what a competitor has seen in the past (Hare et al. 2001;
MacLean and Hare 2012). They thus know that their per-
spective can differ from the perspective of others in the
sense that they know that sometimes they can see objects
that others cannot see and vice versa.
While it is undisputed that chimpanzees possess these so-
called Level 1 perspective-taking skills (Flavell et al. 1978,
1981), it is unclear whether they also have a deeper under-
standing of the other’s perspective. Flavell and colleagues
(Flavell et al. 1978, 1981) introduced the concept of Level 2
perspective-taking to describe higher-level understanding of
perspectives—an understanding that the same object might
appear differently from another perspective (Flavell et al.
1981). A classic way to test Level 2 perspective-taking in
children is to place a picture of a turtle between the exper-
imenter and the child, and ask whether it is standing on its
feet or lying on its back from the experimenter’s perspective
(Flavell et al. 1981; Masangkay et al. 1974). There is evi-
dence that in humans, Level 1 perspective-taking is mas-
tered by the age of 2 years (Flavell et al. 1978; McGuigan
and Doherty 2002; Moll and Tomasello 2006), but Level 2
perspective-taking takes longer, until age 3 (Moll and
Meltzoff 2011), with many studies suggesting an even later
emergence (Flavell et al. 1980, 1981; Masangkay et al.
1974; Pillow and Flavell 1986).
Although Level 2 perspective-taking is harder than
Level 1, it is conceivable that chimpanzees may understand
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that the same object might appear differently from
another’s perspective. Nonsocial appearance–reality tasks
show that great apes know that their own perspective does
not always reflect reality (Karg et al. 2014; Krachun et al.
2009). For example, Karg et al. (2014) presented great apes
one large and one small edible bread stick and occluded
them such that the size relations seemed reversed. Subjects
could then choose which one they wanted. When subjects
had seen the real stick sizes before, they disregarded the
apparent (deceptive) stick sizes and chose according to the
real size relations, not according to their current perception.
They did not do so in a control condition in which they
were naı¨ve about the true size relations. In a similar study
with chimpanzees, Krachun et al. (2009) excluded object
tracking as an explanation for the results.
Chimpanzees thus seem to understand that their own
perspective can differ from reality. However, do they also
understand that others can hold a mistaken perspective? If
they do, they should be able to use this for deceiving
others. However, evidence for chimpanzees’ ability to use
deception to create a false belief in others is limited. There
are several anecdotes that chimpanzees deceive others by
hiding themselves or body parts from their view (de Waal
1998; Whiten and Byrne 1988), and experimental studies
support this notion (Hare et al. 2006; Melis et al. 2006).
Yet, experiments have found that chimpanzees’ deceptive
skills have limited flexibility, raising the question of
whether chimpanzees deceive and hide because they really
understand the other’s false belief, or rather because they
have learned rules about the relation of others’ line of sight
and their behavior in the past (Anderson 1986; Heyes 1993,
1998).
Another line of research casts doubt on whether chim-
panzees are able to understand that another individual can
hold a mistaken perspective: research on false-belief
understanding. While human children succeed in implicit
tasks by the age of about 1 year (for a review, see Bail-
largeon et al. 2010) and in explicit tasks by the age of
4 years (Wellman et al. 2001; Wimmer and Perner 1983),
chimpanzees consistently fail in these tasks, although
several different paradigms have been used (Call and
Tomasello 1999; Kaminski et al. 2008; Krachun et al.
2009, 2010; O’Connell and Dunbar 2003).
Thus, on the one hand, chimpanzees have great diffi-
culties ascribing representations to others that differ from
reality and are independent of the other’s current percep-
tion (as in false-belief scenarios), while on the other hand
they are highly proficient in Level 1 perspective-taking
tasks. We were thus interested in whether they would
succeed on an intermediate level—ascribing false percep-
tions, not false belief, to others. We investigated whether
chimpanzees can predict a conspecific’s false perspective
that differed from their own and from reality. The subject
sat opposite a conspecific competitor, with a vertical board
between them. On the subject’s side, two same-sized edible
sticks were attached to the board, one reaching over the
edge of the board more than the other, such that it seemed
bigger from the competitor’s perspective. The subject
could see that both sticks had the same size. In a previously
established competitive game (see Kaminski et al. 2008;
Schmelz et al. 2011, 2013), the competitor could now
choose one of the sticks in private, and the subject chose
thereafter, without knowing which of the two sticks was
gone. We predicted that if subjects understood the other’s
mistaken perspective, they would prefer the stick that
looked smaller from the competitor’s side in the social
condition, but would not do so in a nonsocial control
condition, in which there was no competitor present.
Study 1: chimpanzees and children
Method
Subjects
Sixteen chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) participated as
subjects in this experiment, 11 females and five males
ranging in age from 7 to 36 years (M = 21.1 years). Eight
apes were nursery-reared, whereas eight were mother-
reared. Two chimpanzees were excluded due to uncoop-
erativeness in the pretest (Annett, 12, and Corry, 35). In
addition, two chimpanzees served as competitors; they
were Kara (female, mother-reared, 7) for the A chimpanzee
group, and Gertruida (female, mother-reared, 19) for the B
chimpanzee group. The competitors never switched roles
with the subjects and vice versa. All subjects were housed
at the Wolfgang Ko¨hler Primate Research Center at the
Leipzig Zoo (Germany), where they lived in social groups
and had access to indoor and outdoor areas. Subjects were
tested in their indoor enclosures, fed according to their
daily routine and never food- or water-deprived. Subjects
all had previous experience with participating in experi-
mental studies and with the general procedure of the
competitive game from previous studies (Kaminski et al.
2008; Schmelz et al. 2011, 2013).
Sixteen 6-year-old children also participated in this
experiment, six boys and 10 girls ranging in age from 6/0
to 6/5 (year/months). Six more children participated, but
were not included in the final sample because they did not
pass the pretest (5) or were not present at their second
testing day (1). Children were recruited from kindergartens
in Leipzig (Germany). They were not informed of the
purpose of the study and were encouraged to collect as
many bread sticks as possible, preferably the big ones. An
adult stooge served as their competitor.
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Materials
The setup and procedure were based on the previously
successfully applied ‘chimp chess’ method by Kaminski
et al. (2008).
Chimpanzees A sliding Table (20 9 80 cm) was placed
on a platform (82.5 9 80 cm) between two enclosures, such
that the subject and the competitor could sit opposite to each
other and the experimenter could move the sliding table back
and forth between them (Fig. 1). The two enclosures
adjoined each other, and chimpanzees could see each other
through the mesh parts that were not blocked by our setup
(e.g., they could look through the mesh next to or underneath
the apparatus). As the chimpanzees moved around freely in
their enclosures, we are thus confident that they were aware
of the presence of the competitor in the social condition.
A barrier was placed on the table between the subject and
the competitor. Depending on the phase of the experiment, a
transparent barrier (44 9 35.5 cm) or an opaque barrier
(44 9 21 cm) was used. Two bread sticks (equally sized in
the test, or one half as long as the other in the pretest and
training) could be fixed to the subject’s side of the barrier
with an elastic strap, such that in the test the subject could
see they had the same length, whereas it seemed like one
was much bigger than the other to the competitor (Fig. 2). A
sliding door (55 9 96 cm) could be installed on the sub-
ject’s side of the sliding table to prevent the subject from
seeing the sticks. The subject could slide it open to the left
or right side and could then see the stick on the opened side
(their view on the other stick was blocked by a small ver-
tical barrier between the two sticks). An additional red
occluder (80 9 51 cm) was used to block the competitor’s
or subject’s view when necessary. Chimpanzees could
choose a stick by poking their fingers through the corre-
sponding side of the mesh, or, if the door was installed,
subjects could choose by sliding the door open (they would
receive the stick that they revealed, if one was present).
Children The setup was the same as for the chimpanzees,
except that they sat at a table in their kindergartens, and
their competitor was an adult stooge. Children received
‘treasure boxes’ and were told that the goal of the game
was to collect as many sticks as possible, preferably the big
ones.
Design
Each subject was tested in a social and a nonsocial con-
dition. Chimpanzees received two consecutive sessions
with 12 trials each per condition, resulting in 24 trials in
total. Due to testing time constraints, children received one
session with eight trials per condition. Sessions were
administered on different days, with a maximum of 4 days
between sessions. The order of conditions was counter-
balanced for sex (children) and age and sex (chimpanzees).
Procedure
The procedure was the same for chimpanzees and children,
except that chimpanzees had to pass a procedure training
before receiving test sessions, to ensure that they (1) knew
how to operate the sliding door, and (2) understood the
course of events. The procedure training trials were the
same as in the social pretest (see below), and subjects had
to choose correctly in at least 10/12 trials in two consec-
utive sessions by choosing the remaining smaller stick after
the competitor.
Since children had never played chimp chess, they
received verbal instructions and a demonstration instead.
Before each session started, the experimenter briefly
explained the game to them. She installed two big bread
sticks at the transparent barrier on the sliding table and slid
the table back and forth on the table. She explained that the
players were allowed to choose one of the bread sticks by
pointing to them when the barrier was on their side. SheFig. 1 Schematic bird’s eye view of the experimental setup
Fig. 2 Subject’s and competitor’s view of the experimental setup
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then introduced the sliding door, slid the table to the sub-
ject’s side, let the subject open the door on both sides once,
and gave her the corresponding stick.
After the chimpanzees passed the procedure training and
the children experienced the door demonstrations, all
subjects moved on to the test sessions. The procedure was
the same in the two test conditions, except that there was
no competitor present in the nonsocial condition.
Each session consisted of three phases: pretest (8 trials),
training (8 trials), and test (12 trials). In each phase, the
experimenter started baiting the string on her far side first
and the other thereafter according to a predefined
scheme that determined which of the sticks was the bigger-
looking one from the competitor’s side (or the truly bigger
one in the pretest and training). The stick constellation
order was randomized with the constraint that the same
constellation of bread sticks could not be presented more
than twice in a row.
1. Pretest The transparent barrier was placed on the
centered sliding table, and a big and a small bread stick
were attached to the strings (with their upper ends
aligned). Then, the table was slid to the competitor’s
side, the competitor chose the longer stick by sticking
her finger through the corresponding side of the mesh
(nothing happened in the nonsocial condition), the
sliding door was installed, and the table was moved to
the subject. Now, the subject was allowed to open the
door to one side and receive the reward behind it (big
or small stick in the nonsocial condition, small or no
stick in the social condition). The pretest ensured that
the subject paid attention to the general course of
events, and that she remembered the location of the
remaining stick. Subjects were only included in the
final sample if they chose the remaining stick reliably
(at least seven out of eight trials) after having seen the
competitor choosing. In addition, they had to demon-
strate that they had understood the goal of the game by
showing a preference for the bigger stick in at least six
out of eight trials when choosing between a big and a
small stick in the nonsocial condition.
2. Training The procedure was similar to the pretest, but
with the following changes: The additional red barrier
was introduced to ensure that the players could never
see each other, thus excluding the possibility that the
subject could base her decision on subtle cues like the
competitor’s gaze direction instead of mentally repre-
senting her perspective. The barrier was placed in front
of the competitor’s viewing window during the baiting
(with no competitor present in the nonsocial sessions)
and subsequently was placed in front of the viewing
window of the player while the competitor was
choosing. In addition, the sliding door was installed
right after the baiting. This training ensured that the
subjects got used to the procedure and, in the social
sessions, to the fact that after the competitor had
chosen, there was only one stick (the smaller) left
(while in the nonsocial session, both sticks were still
present).
3. Test The opaque barrier was placed on the sliding
table, and the competitor’s viewing window was
blocked. Two big bread sticks of the same size were
attached to the barrier on the subject’s side, so that
from the competitor’s side, one stick looked longer
than the other (Fig. 2). The procedure was the same as
in the training, except that the competitor did not
receive any of the sticks after choosing (for the
chimpanzees, the competitor secretly received a
reward from the experimenter, to keep up her attention;
in the children’s case, the adult stooge just pretended to
put a stick in her box by noisily opening and closing
it). Thus, the subject received a reward no matter what
she chose during the test phase, excluding the possi-
bility of learning effects over the course of the 8
(children)/24 (chimpanzees) trials. Therefore, after the
competitor’s turn, both sticks were still present when
the subject chose; however, if the subject understood
that one looked bigger to the competitor than the other,
she should avoid the seemingly bigger, riskier stick in
the social condition, but not in the nonsocial condition.
Data scoring and analysis
We scored a choice when the subject opened the sliding
door to the left or right side (test). All choices were live
coded, but trials were also videotaped for later analysis. A
second independent observer coded a random sample of
20 % of all the sessions for reliability. The interrater
agreement was excellent (Cohen’s j = 1.0, p\ .0001).
Results
Procedure training and pretest
Two chimpanzees were excluded due to uncooperativeness
(Annett, Corry). The others needed 2–3 procedure training
sessions to pass the criterion [M (range) = 2, (2–3)], and
all passed their session pretests [M = 99 % correct,
(81–100)]. Children also did well in their pretests
[M = 93 % correct, (75–100)].
Training
When choosing between a small and a big stick on a
transparent barrier, both chimpanzees and children picked
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the big stick at high rates in the nonsocial condition
[chimpanzees: M = 91 % (69–100) of trials with choice of
bigger stick; children: M = 87 % (50–100)], children were
quite successful in refraining from choosing the big stick
after the competitor had chosen [M = 28 % (0–62)]. In
contrast, chimpanzees still picked the location of the big
stick (which was empty after the competitor had chosen) in
more than half of the trials [M = 60 % (25–94)]. This
preference was significantly above chance [one-sample
t test comparing to 50 %: t(15) = 2.60; p = .02]. Both
chimpanzees and children chose the big stick significantly
more often when they were alone compared to when a
competitor chose before them [repeated-measures ANOVA
with order as between-subject factor; chimpanzees:
F(1,14) = 32.64, p\ .001, g2 = .70; children:
F(1,14) = 100.92, p\ .001, g2 = .88].
Test
Figure 3 shows that chimpanzees chose the stick that
looked bigger to the competitor less often when the com-
petitor was present, compared to the nonsocial control
[repeated-measures ANOVA with order as between-subject
factor: F(1,14) = 10.18, p = .007, g2 = .42; observed
power = .843].
For children, we found an interaction between con-
dition and order, F(1, 14) = 11.39, p = .005, g2 = .45
(see Fig. 3). Children who received the social condition
first chose the smaller-looking stick significantly more in
the social condition [M = 75 % (50–100)] compared to
the nonsocial control [M = 43 % (13–50); paired-sam-
ples t test, t(7) = 2.97, p = .021], while children in the
nonsocial first group did not behave differently in the
two conditions [paired-samples t test, t(7) = .68,
p = .52]: they chose the smaller-looking stick on an
average of 47 % (38–63) (nonsocial condition) and
48.4 % (38–50) (social condition) of the trials, thus
almost equally often in both conditions. Children’s per-
formance did not differ between order groups in the
nonsocial condition [independent samples t test:
t(14) = .91, p = .38], but children with the social con-
dition first performed significantly better in the social
condition than children in the other group [independent
samples t test: t(9) = 2.54, p = .032].
A majority of chimpanzees had a significant side pref-
erence when opening the sliding door: six out of 16 showed
a side preference in both conditions, three others only in
the social condition, and three others only in the nonsocial
control.
In children, side preferences were less prominent. Out of
the 16 children, two showed a side preference only in the
social condition, two others only in the nonsocial control,
and two others in both conditions.
We were also interested in whether subjects’ behavior
differed from chance. We thus performed one-sample
t tests and found that children behaved different from
chance in the social condition [t(15) = 2.21, p = .043], but
chose randomly in the nonsocial control [t(15) = 1.96,
p = .07]. This was different for chimpanzees: They had a
significant preference for the stick that looked bigger from
the other side in the nonsocial control [t(15) = 2.47,
p = .026], and this preference was reduced to chance when
the competitor was present [t(15) = .88, p = .40].
We looked at individual performances to find out whe-
ther our effect is driven by a couple of successful indi-
viduals rather than the majority of subjects.
In the nonsocial control, two of the 16 chimpanzees
had a significant preference for the bigger-looking stick
(Pia, 18/24, and Frodo, 19/24). In the social condition,
one chimpanzee had a significant preference for the
correct (smaller-looking) stick (Alex, 17/24). The
clearest difference in choice behavior between condi-
tions was observed in Pia, who had no preference for
any stick when she was alone (12/24), but avoided the
bigger-looking stick significantly when a competitor had
chosen before her. Altogether, 11 subjects chose the
bigger-looking stick more when they were alone com-
pared to choosing after a competitor, three showed no
difference between conditions, and only two the reversed
pattern.
Fig. 3 Percentage of trials in which the stick chosen looked bigger
from the competitor’s side in the test conditions. Children’s
performance is split for the order in which they received the
conditions. Children who received the social condition first chose the
smaller-looking stick significantly more in the social condition
compared to the nonsocial control, while children in the nonsocial
first group did not behave differently in the two conditions. Error bars
indicate 95 % confidence intervals. The horizontal line indicates
50 %
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Of all children in the nonsocial condition, only one
individual had a significant preference for the bigger-
looking stick (Julia, 7/8), while in the social condition, four
individuals significantly preferred the correct (smaller-
looking) stick (Oskar, Julia, Yannick: 7/8; Theophil, 8/8).
The highest difference between conditions was observed in
Julia, who chose six bigger-looking sticks more when she
was alone compared to when a competitor had chosen
before her.
Discussion
When confronted with a competitor who possesses a mis-
taken perspective on two same-sized food sticks, chim-
panzees and the group of children who received the social
condition first correctly adjusted their behavior compared
to a nonsocial control condition: Although they could see
that both sticks had the same size, they avoided the
seemingly bigger stick more often when choosing after the
competitor than when no competitor was present. However,
chimpanzees and children differed in an important way:
While children chose randomly in the nonsocial control
and avoided the seemingly bigger stick in the social con-
dition, chimpanzees preferentially chose the stick that
looked bigger from the other side in the nonsocial control
but chose randomly in the social condition.
For children in the social first group, it is therefore clear
that they perceived both sticks as equally big, and still
understood the competitor’s mistaken perspective on the
sticks. They thus engaged in Level 2 perspective-taking
sensu Flavell et al. (1978, 1981). The fact that there was no
difference between conditions if they received the nonso-
cial condition first could be due to a reduced motivation to
participate in the study again after the first nonsocial ses-
sion (which was clearly less entertaining than the social
game), or the impression that they would receive a reward
no matter what they chose. Children’s willingness to
engage in Level 2 perspective-taking might thus be readily
substituted by simpler and less demanding behavioral rules.
In contrast to children, the interpretation for the chim-
panzees with regard to Level 2 perspective-taking is not as
clear. Although they also significantly avoided the stick
that looked bigger from the competitor’s side more in the
social than in the nonsocial condition (as children did), this
difference between conditions was less prominent com-
pared to children, and they had a preference for this riskier
stick in the nonsocial control. This preference might have
been because the subjects perceived the stick further up as
bigger and/or more attractive. There are at least two pos-
sible interpretations for the difference in their behavior
between conditions. One is that chimpanzees, like children,
really understood the competitor’s mistaken perspective,
correctly predicted her behavior based on that (Level 2
perspective-taking) and overcame their own preference in
the social condition. The other possibility is that they
projected their preference of the stick further up to the
competitor and consequently avoided this stick when she
had chosen before them. This would mean that they
understood the competitor’s motivation, but not that the
competitor’s motivation was based on a false perception.
An alternative explanation would be that chimpanzees
had a preference for the bigger-looking stick themselves
and did not project this preference, but just got confused
about the location of that stick as soon as a competitor was
present. However, this is unlikely because they did not
choose randomly in the competitor’s presence during the
training in which they need similar memory skills.
One possible explanation for chimpanzees’ preference
in the nonsocial control is that they perceived the stick
further up as bigger. This preference could have arisen,
e.g., by the chimpanzees being primed to perceive one stick
as bigger than the other in the training. Previous studies
have shown that chimpanzees and other nonhuman pri-
mates are susceptible to misleading visual input, but often
to a different degree compared to humans (Barbet and
Fagot 2002, 2007; Fujita 1997, 2001; Parron and Fagot
2007; Suganuma et al. 2007). Chimpanzees could also have
perceived the stick further up as more attractive for other
reasons, e.g., as easier to grab.
We thus conducted Study 2 with chimpanzees to dis-
criminate between the Level 2 and the preference projec-
tion interpretations by changing the setup such that a
preference for one of the sticks in the nonsocial control was
less likely.
Study 2: chimpanzees—a follow-up
Method
Subjects
Sixteen chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) participated in this
experiment, nine females and seven males ranging in age
from 12 to 22 years (M = 15.4 years). One chimpanzee
was excluded due to uncooperativeness (Pasa, 14) and four
others because they did not reach criterion in the pretest
within 10 sessions (Kalema, 17; Kisembo, 14; Nani, 12;
Sally, 22). In addition, one chimpanzee served as com-
petitor (Asega; male, 15).
All subjects were living at Ngamba Island Chimpanzee
Sanctuary, Uganda (www.ngambaisland.org). All came to
the sanctuary as orphans as a result of the illegal bushmeat
trade and were then raised by humans together with peers
and later often adopted by conspecific foster mothers. They
all lived in social groups at the time of testing and could
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move freely in a 100-acre rainforest during the day. They
moved voluntarily into their enclosure for eating and
sleeping in the evenings, where they were tested in the
mornings before moving into the forest. They were fed
according to their daily routine and never food- or water-
deprived. Subjects all had previous experience with par-
ticipating in experimental studies.
Materials
The setup was the same as in Study 1, with the only dif-
ference that we substituted the opaque barrier to which the
sticks were attached with a barrier that was less likely to
create a stick preference for the subjects because both
sticks were at the same height (Fig. 4). The barrier was
44 9 18 cm, but with a 22 9 6 cm piece removed.
Design
The design was the same as in Study 1. Five chimpanzees
received the nonsocial condition first, the other six the
social condition first. The order of conditions was again
counterbalanced for age and sex.
Procedure, data scoring, and analysis
All as in Study 1. The interobserver agreement was again
excellent (Cohen’s j = 1.0, p\ .0001).
Results
Procedure training and pretest
Chimpanzees needed on average seven (2–11) door train-
ing sessions to pass the criterion, and all passed their ses-
sion pretests [M = 87 % correct, (75–100)].
Training
When choosing between a small and a big stick on a
transparent barrier, chimpanzees picked the big stick at
high rates in the nonsocial condition [M = 71 % (56–81)],
but inhibited going for the big stick after the competitor
had chosen [M = 45 % (25–63)]. They chose the big stick
significantly more often when they were alone compared to
when a competitor chose before them [repeated-measures
ANOVA with order as between-subject factor;
F(1,9) = 38.98, p\ .001, g2 = .81]. Their behavior in the
social condition was not significantly different from chance
[one-sample t test comparing to 50 %: t(10) = 1.70;
p = .12].
Test
Figure 5 shows that chimpanzees did not choose the stick
that looked bigger to the competitor less often when the
competitor was present, compared to the nonsocial control
[repeated-measures ANOVA with order as between-subject
factor; F(1,9) = 1.58, p = .24, g2 = .15], and chose in
both conditions randomly. Seven out of 11 individuals had
a significant side preference in both conditions, two only in
the social condition, and one only in the nonsocial control.
None of the individuals had a significant preference for the
bigger-looking or smaller-looking stick in any condition.
Discussion
In contrast to Study 1, chimpanzees now did not prefer one
of the sticks in the nonsocial condition any more. However,
they were now also not able to correctly predict the
behavior of a competitor who was holding a mistaken
perspective on the sticks.
Fig. 4 Subject’s and competitor’s view of the experimental setup in
Study 2. While the subject could see that both sticks had the same
size, to the competitor one stick seemed bigger than the other
Fig. 5 Percentage of trials in which the stick was chosen that looked
bigger from the competitor’s side in Study 2. Error bars indicate
95 % confidence intervals
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While this indicated that we successfully eliminated the
stick preference in the nonsocial condition, we also elim-
inated their avoidance of the riskier stick in the social
condition. What could account for this result?
First, this could be evidence that chimpanzees, when
they do not have a preference themselves, are not able to
understand others’ preferences. This would be in line with
research on false-belief understanding, in which chim-
panzees consistently fail to attribute false beliefs, thus
representations that differ from their own, to others (Call
and Tomasello 1999; Kaminski et al. 2008; Krachun et al.
2009, 2010; O’Connell and Dunbar 2003).
Second, it is possible that with the changed setup, it was
more difficult for chimpanzees to reason about the stick
size relations from the competitor’s perspective. Although
we tried to change the barrier as little as possible to make
the apparent differences in stick attractiveness disappear
and kept the procedure exactly the same, we cannot fully
rule out this concern.
Third, we tested a different sample of chimpanzees that
might differ in their cognitive capacities to understand
others’ perspectives and their ability to play this competi-
tive game. In addition, the competitor was male in Study 2
and female in Study 1, and hierarchy processes could have
played a role. Two major points speak against this expla-
nation. First, the sample in Study 2 was more successful in
the training compared to the sample in Study 1, an indi-
cator for their even better understanding of the rules of the
game and for their willingness to compete also with a male
conspecific. Second, there are several studies with this
back-and-forth paradigm that have successfully been con-
ducted with the chimpanzees in sample 2 (J. Kaminski,
unpublished data). In addition, both samples had previous
experience with experimental testing. We thus think that it
is unlikely that they failed because of mere confusion about
the game, a lack of cognitive capacities or aloofness with a
male competitor.
General discussion
We conducted two studies to assess whether chimpanzees
can correctly predict a competitor’s behavior that is based
on a mistaken perspective. In Study 1, we found that
chimpanzees as well as the group of 6-year-old children
who received the social condition first avoided the food
stick (out of two same-sized sticks) that looked longer from
the competitor’s side more when a competitor had chosen
before them compared to when they were alone.
While it was clear from the nonsocial control that child
subjects correctly perceived the sticks as having the same
length themselves, chimpanzees perceived the stick that
looked bigger to the competitor as more attractive
themselves. They could thus have solved the task either
like children by Level 2 perspective-taking, or by pro-
jecting their own preference to the other. To distinguish
between these two possibilities, we carried out a second
study with a slight change in the setup that eliminated the
perceived difference in the sticks’ attractiveness. With this
new setup, chimpanzees did not show any differences in
their choice behavior between social and nonsocial condi-
tion any more.
Our results suggest that chimpanzees successfully pre-
dicted what the competitor would choose when they were
guided by their own preference. However, when they did
not have a preference themselves and they were required to
understand the other’s mistaken perspective, they failed to
do so. In contrast, 6-year-old children successfully con-
trasted their own true perspective with the mistaken per-
spective of the competitor, thus engaged in Level 2
perspective-taking (Flavell et al. 1978, 1981). As all of our
test trials were nondifferentially rewarded, we can exclude
learning as an explanation for these results.
Previous research has shown that children successfully
master most Level 2 perspective-taking tasks by the age of
4–5 years (Flavell et al. 1980, 1981; Masangkay et al.
1974; Pillow and Flavell 1986). This parallels the devel-
opment of explicit false-belief reasoning, a skill that
unfolds around the same time (Wellman et al. 2001;
Wimmer and Perner 1983). This parallel development
might not be a coincidence—both require the skill of
contrasting differing representations (see Flavell 1986;
Gopnik and Astington 1988). In fact, results from neuro-
science support this claim: Aichhorn et al. (2006) found
that false belief and higher-level visual perspective-taking
tasks partially activate the same brain areas.
Chimpanzees seem to have problems with contrasting
perspectives. In various studies that test their false-belief
understanding, chimpanzees consistently fail to do so (Call
and Tomasello 1999; Kaminski et al. 2008; Krachun et al.
2009, 2010; O’Connell and Dunbar 2003). They also fail to
create misleading information by actively hiding food from
competitors (Karg et al. 2015a, b). However, they suc-
cessfully attribute knowledge and ignorance to others
(Crockford et al. 2012; Hare et al. 2000, 2001; Kaminski
et al. 2008), a skill that could underlie their success in
Level 1 perspective-taking tasks.
But chimpanzees did not fail entirely in our experi-
ment—when they themselves had a preference, they were
able to use it to correctly predict the competitor’s choice.
While there is no evidence for Level 2 perspective-taking,
it still indicates two remarkable skills. First, chimpanzees
are able to overcome the seduction of choosing the item
that they prefer themselves when they choose after a
competitor, supporting two recent findings by Schmelz
et al. (2011, 2013). This is a noteworthy finding given that
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chimpanzees have only limited inhibitory control (see, e.g.,
Boysen 1996; Vlamings et al. 2006, 2010). The difficulty to
inhibit choosing the bigger item decreases with the ratio of
the presented food quantities (Boysen et al. 2001; Uher and
Call 2008). As there were no real size differences between
the sticks from the subject’s perspective, the perceived
difference in size or attractiveness was probably small and
easy to overcome.
Second, our results indicate that chimpanzees under-
stand others’ desires, at least if they match their own.
Buttelmann et al. (2009) found that chimpanzees used
others’ facial expression (happiness/disgust) when choos-
ing containers with food inside. However, considering that
chimpanzees have problems contrasting conflicting per-
spectives, it is an open question whether they can correctly
predict another’s preference if it does not match their own.
But if chimpanzees really have trouble contrasting dif-
fering perspectives, why do they succeed in appearance–
reality tasks, in which they have to contrast their apparent
actual perspective with reality? There is a crucial differ-
ence between these tasks that could explain this difference.
In our Level 2 perspective-taking task, subjects had no
experience with the other’s perspective, while in the
appearance–reality tasks (Karg et al. 2014; Krachun and
Call 2009) they have experienced the true perspective
before. This self-experience could help them to understand
the differing perspective as the representation can be
retrieved from their memory. Another recent study sup-
ports this view. Karg et al. (2015a, b) found that chim-
panzees understood that a competitor could see through a
screen while they themselves could not, after having gained
visual self-experience with the other perspective on the
screen before. The role of self-experience in understanding
other perspectives is further supported by a study with
scrub jays (Clayton et al. 2007). Scrub jays who had pil-
fered other jays’ caches before re-cached their food when
the hiding event was observed by a competitor; naı¨ve jays
without pilfering experience did not do so. It is thus an
interesting question whether experiencing the setup from
the competitor’s side first may facilitate the subjects’ suc-
cess in perspective-taking tasks.
In sum, while there is evidence that chimpanzees are
skilled in complex Level 1 perspective-taking and can use
their own experience to reason about the perspectives and
preferences of others, ‘putting themselves in the mental
shoes’ of others that are really different seems to be a
cognitive challenge for them. However, the perspective-
taking process might be facilitated by own experience with
the alien perspective or preference.
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